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ABSTRACT 
The recent financial and economic crisis in the United States and the rest of the world, 
as well as the interventionist efforts of respective governments to stabilize their 
economies, have generated a lot of controversy about the virtues of the free-market 
system and the wisdom of state intervention. The objective of this article is to put the 
debate on the relative efficiency of the free-market and government intervention in a 
larger theoretical perspective and make the case for the importance of efficient 
regulatory governance of financial institutions in ensuring economic stability. Drawing 
on the theories of laissez faire and market failure, the Keynesian and Marxian theories 
and the theory of regulation, I argue that mutual co-existence of the market and the 
government is beneficial to society, and that periodic global financial crisis occur 
because of the failure to learn from history and  ineffective regulatory governance. 
Governments need to put in place proactive regulatory framework to guard against 
regulatory capture, arbitrage and forbearance in order to control financial market 
excesses.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The recent financial and economic crisis in the United States and the rest of the 
world, as well as the interventionist efforts of respective governments to stabilize their 
economies have generated a lot of intellectual debate and controversy about the virtues 
of the free market system, and the role of government in an economy. Fearful of the 
escalation of the financial crisis in September 2008, leaders of the western industrialized 
nations took drastic measures to rescue troubled financial institutions in their respective 
countries. The United States led the way by embarking on the most sweeping 
government economic intervention since the great depression through series of financial 
sector rescue packages, followed by Great Britain, and other European countries with 
comparable rescue packages for their financial institutions.  A study conducted by 
Anderson, Cavanagh and Redman (2008) for the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) 
reveals that as of November 13, 2008, the key components of the U.S. financial sector 
bailout amounted to $1.3 trillion, while the European financial sector bailouts amounted 
to $2.8 trillion. Together, the bailouts by the western nations amounted to $4.1 trillion 
in commitments. Tables I and 2 show the details of the United States and Western 
European countries commitment to the financial sector bailouts as of November 13, 
2008.  
In the United States alone, as illustrated in Table 1, $700 billion was approved 
for the troubled asset relief program and another $243 billion for commercial paper 
funding facility, $200 billion in cash injections to keep Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
afloat, $112.5 billion to rescue AIG, $29 billion to guarantee Bear Stearns’ losses on 
investment portfolio, and $13.2 billion for FDIC takeovers (Anderson, Cavanagh & 
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Redman, 2008). On top of all this, the United States Congress in February 2009 
approved 787 billon dollars to stimulate the economy and additional packages have 
been announced to address the depressing housing market.  Table 2 also reveals that the 
United Kingdom committed $734 billion for interbank lending and short term loans, 
Germany $637 billion to guarantee medium term lending and recapitalization, and 
France $483 billion to guarantee bank debt and recapitalization. As laudable as these 
rescue packages may be, many worry that such efforts do not only subsidize financial 
sector inefficiencies and unscrupulous behavior of free-market actors, but also divert 
much needed resources from other social problems that need to be addressed.  
 
Table 1: US Commitment to Financial Sector Bailout as of November 13, 2008) ($ 
Billions Unless Otherwise Stated) 
Program Amount Description 
 
Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) 
 
700.0 Original plan was to use the funds 
primarily to purchase troubled mortgage-
related assets. The Treasury Secretary has 
since decided to use the funds for cash 
injections for banks.  
 Commercial Paper Funding 
Facility 
 
243.00 
Through this facility, the Fed buys 
commercial paper (short-term debts) from 
banks to help finance day-to-day business 
operations. 
 Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac 
 
200.00 
Federal officials assumed control of the 
mortgage firms and are providing cash 
injections to keep them afloat. 
 AIG 112.5 
Does not include $40 billion drawn from 
the $700 billion bailout fund. After an 
initial bailout in October, AIG negotiated 
a larger rescue package with easier terms. 
 Bear Stearns 29.0 
Special lending facility to guarantee losses 
on the investment bank’s portfolio; 
facilitated buyout by JPMorgan. 
 FDIC Bank Takeovers 13.2 
The Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation has put up to cover deposits 
on failed banks. 
 Total U.S. $1.3 
trillion 
 
Source: Anderson, Cavanagh and Redman (Instituted for Policy Studies, 
November2008) 
 
The neo-classical school of economics is divided over the relative merits of the 
market and the state in achieving the objectives of efficient allocation of resources to 
strengthen the financial sector, to reverse the downturn of the economy and to ensure 
high aggregate demand, low unemployment, low inflation and high economic growth. 
Proponents of the free-market system argue that without government intervention, the 
dynamics  of demand and supply will help the economy adjust to recession and automa-            
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 10  ·  Issue 2  ·  2009  ·  © International Public Management Network 
25 
 
Table 2: Western European Commitment to Financial Sector Bailout as of 
November 13, 2008) ($ Billions Unless Otherwise Stated) 
Country Amount Description 
 United Kingdom 743.0 
The UK bailout was the first announced 
and largely served as the model for other 
European rescues. Half of the package is 
for guaranteeing inter-bank lending, 40% 
for short-term loans and 10% for 
recapitalization. 
 Germany 
 
636.5 
The bulk is to guarantee medium-term 
bank lending, with 20% for 
recapitalization. 
 France 
 
458.3 
The bulk is to guarantee bank debt, with 
about $50 billion for recapitalization. 
 
 
Netherlands 
 
346.0 
To guarantee inter-bank loans. 
 
 
Sweden 200.0 
For credit guarantees. 
 
 
Austria 127.3 
For bank buyouts, interbank lending, and 
bank bond issuance guarantees 
 
 
Spain 127.3 
For bank buyouts, interbank lending, and 
bank bond issuance guarantees. 
 
 
Italy 51.0 
To purchase bank debts. 
 Other European 
Countries 
110.6 
 
 Total European $2.8 
trillion 
 
Source: Anderson, Cavanagh and Redman (Instituted for Policy Studies, 
November2008) 
Note: European currency conversions to US Dollars based on exchange rates as of 
11/14/08. 
tically correct its imbalances, by purging inefficiencies within the system, and then 
move toward equilibrium and the strengthening of the overall economy.  Advocates of 
intervention argue that the current recession and financial crisis constitute a 
manifestation of market failure and that the role of the government is to mitigate the 
undesirable consequences of market activity through regulation and appropriate fiscal 
policy instruments without losing the benefits of competitive economy.  
In spite of the on going debate, few studies are yet to focus on the importance of 
mutual co-existence of both market and government and the significance of effective 
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regulatory governance to the health of a nation’s financial sector and the overall 
economy. The objective of this article is to put the debate on the relative efficiency of 
the free-market and government intervention in a larger theoretical and regulatory 
perspective and make the case for the importance of efficient regulatory governance of 
financial institutions in ensuring economic stability. Drawing on the theories of laissez 
faire and market failure, the Keynesian and Marxian theories and the theory of 
regulation, I argue that mutual co-existence of the market and the government is 
beneficial to society, and that periodic global financial crisis occur because of failure to 
learn from history and  ineffective regulatory governance. Governments and their 
regulatory authorities need to put in place proactive regulatory framework and 
institutional safeguards to guard against regulatory capture arbitrage and forbearance in 
order to control financial market excesses.  
 
REGULATORY POLICY AND ECONOMIC STABILITY 
 Regulation is a mechanism to insist that public purposes be respected by 
businesses and other nongovernmental institutions in their operations (Lehne, 2006). 
Our understanding of the role of regulation in the relationship between government and 
private institutions is dominated by two basic theories – the public interest theory and 
the private interest theory (Mitnick, 1980). According to the public interest theory, 
regulation is instituted for the protection and benefit of the public at large or some large 
subclass of the public. Most analysis based on this view present regulation as a response 
to market failure (Bernstein, 1955) by, for example, seeking to achieve the benefits of 
market place competition for consumers and society in situations in which competition 
does not occur.  
The theory of market failure is concerned with establishing the conditions under 
which competitive market allocations will be inefficient. The theory suggests that under 
certain conditions, the production and distribution of a good or service through a 
competitive market in which all the relevant agents are pursuing their own self-interest 
will result in an allocation of that good or service that is socially inefficient. This 
implies in the situation where companies have power to fix prices or limit competition,  
consumers lack the information needed to make the best product choices,  market 
exchanges affect people who are not party to the transaction,  the structure of an 
industry creates barriers to entry (Lehne, 2006), or market allocations result in inequities 
in the distribution of income and wealth, a market failure has occurred and government 
can put in place appropriate institutional and regulatory framework to correct it. 
The private interest perspective of regulation views it as a means to pursue 
private interest, and nothing more than an effort to use government authority to 
redistribute income from one group to another.  For example, a company with less than 
optimal profit can invest in lobbying  effort to secure beneficial regulatory action (Owen 
& Braeutigam, 1978), and members of Congress can benefit by transforming regulation 
into pork barrel politics (Posner, 1969). The need for good regulatory governance as 
part of a broader effort to prevent or better manage financial crisis and ensure economic 
stability stems from the fact that a financial system is only as strong as its governing 
practices, the financial soundness of its institutions, and the efficiency of its market 
infrastructure. Just as market participants in the financial system should establish good 
governance practices to gain the confidence of their customers and to help ensure a 
stable economy, regulators have fiduciary responsibility to follow sound governance 
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practices in their operations to maintain credibility and moral authority in their 
oversight responsibilities. This requires the establishment of appropriate economic and 
regulatory policies to prevent political and institutional interference in the regulatory 
supervision of financial institutions, as well as to prevent regulatory forbearance, 
regulatory arbitrage and regulatory capture. Unfortunately, undue interference and 
ineffectiveness of oversight have contributed to the depth and magnitude of nearly all 
financial crisis in recent years (Udaibir, Quintyn & Taylor, 2002). 
 
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND INEFFICIENT REGULATORY GOVERNANCE 
 Stigler (1971) suggests that regulators are commonly subject to intense and 
effective pressure from regulated firms to modify regulations and their implementation 
to suit the interests of the latter. Regulated firms may exercise pressure at the political 
level, for example, by supplying politicians with one-sided evidence supporting their 
positions and attempting to gain their allegiance through campaign contributions. 
Additionally, they may exercise pressure and influence at the regulatory agency level by 
implicitly offering agency staff lucrative employment opportunities in exchange for 
being cooperative, and generally inducing the regulators to identify with the regulated 
industry (Hardy, 2006). As emphasized by Laffont and Tirole (1991) and Laffont 
(1999), regulatory capture is likely to be more effective when one interest group is 
highly concentrated and organized and has much at stake, and when the regulations are 
technically complex and asymmetric information is pervasive, so that outside 
verification is difficult. 
 Some empirical evidence indicates capture affects regulation in the banking  
(Kane, 1990), non-bank (Woodward, 1998) financial sectors and related areas of 
activities such as accounting (Godfrey & Langfield-Smith, 2004). In his analysis of how 
U.S. savings and loan institutions successfully influenced the regulations applied to 
them, Kane (1990) argues both the regulatory agency and the U.S. Congress were not 
only subject to influence but also had conflicting incentives. In his subsequent study, 
Kane (2001) also found while capture was not complete, managerial and bureaucratic 
interest, as well as budget constraints and shifting objectives contributed to what 
became a debacle. Rosenbluth and Schaap (2003) present evidence to support their 
hypothesis that different electoral rules will affect the extent to which bank regulations 
favor producers over consumers of financial services. From the standpoint of regulatory 
capture, such a situation could be a reflection of a certain commonality of outlook and 
interests of the financial institution and the regulators. For example, Hardy (2006) 
suggests the bank of England used to view the promotion of the City of London as one 
of its prime mandates, and much of the debate on harmonized regulations in the run up 
to the European Monetary Union consisted of defense of national financial industries by 
the respective central banks. 
 Historical and empirical evidence show that regulatory arbitrage is a significant 
contributing factor behind the failure of financial institutions. In Japan, credit 
cooperatives were subject to looser supervision and regulation than those applied to 
banks, a fact which allowed them to engage in more risky banking activities than in the 
banks. These relaxed restrictions on their lending  to  non-members enabled them to 
engage in unhealthy competition in the credit market, which indirectly contributed to 
the weakening of all financial institutions (Kanaya & Woo, 2000). In the United States, 
research by Minton, Sanders and Strahan (2004) show that unregulated finance 
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companies and investment banks are much more apt to securitize assets than banks, and 
that risky and high levered financial institution are more likely to engage in 
securitization than safer ones. 
 Regulatory forbearance has also been a significant problem regarding the 
monitoring of financial soundness and undue risk taking by financial institutions in 
western advance countries. Following the savings and loans debacle in the 1980s, the 
United States Congress imposed on federal regulators an obligation to take proactive 
steps to control taxpayer exposure to loss from bank risk-taking. The goal was to 
monitor and to discipline the extent to which a bank’s capital position can comfortably 
absorb the risk exposures that the bank pursues. As Mathews (1998) argued, despite this 
pattern of monitoring and control, the nation’s 100 largest banks lost almost one-fourth 
of their market capitalization in the third quarter of 1998.  The root cause of the 
problem, as explained by Kane (2000), is that regulators seemed disinclined to constrain 
circumvention opportunities  by enforcing market-based standards and definitions for 
measuring bank risk and bank capital instead of accounting-based ratios and definitions. 
As discussed in subsequent sections of this article, the continual existence of such a 
problem and failure to learn from history such as the Japanese financial crisis 
contributed toward the 2008 global financial crisis.  
 During the Japanese financial crisis in the 1990s, the lack of independence of the 
financial supervision function within the ministry of finance and the inability of the 
regulators to take steps quickly to address and forestall problems in the financial system 
is widely believed to have contributed toward the financial sector weakness. Typical of 
most banking crisis, the underlying causes of the Japanese banking crisis were excessive 
asset expansion in periods of economic boom, liberalization without an appropriate 
adjustment of the regulatory environment, weak corporate governance and regulatory 
forbearance when the system is under stress (Kanaya & Woo, 2000). As noted by Hoshi 
& Kashyap (1999), this situation had profound consequences for the banks and other 
depository institutions. The keen price competition placed downward pressure on 
banks’ risk-adjusted  interest rate margins,  and led them to expand the riskier segments 
of their loan portfolios by sharply increasing lending to the real estate industry, 
consumers and small and medium sized enterprises (Hoshi & Kashyap, 1999).  
Expert accounts of the Japanese financial crisis show  persistent focus on market 
share and the basing of lending decisions primarily on collateral rather than cash flow 
analysis caused the Japanese banks to loosen credit standard as real estate prices 
climbed (Kanaya & Woo 2000). Despite these lack of controls, and evidence of 
worsening conditions in the banking system, the authorities did little between 1990 and 
1995, to address the problem. After 1995, it had become evident that systematic public 
intervention was inevitable, but the regulators hesitated to take strong action because of 
fear of triggering public panic, especially in the absence of an adequate deposit 
insurance scheme and a legal framework for bank restructuring to deal with a full blown 
banking crisis. Therefore, until 1997, the regulators were thought to have exercised 
forbearance (Kanaya & Woo, 2000). Although the Japanese banking crisis served as a 
warning that such a crisis can befall a seemingly robust and relatively sophisticated 
financial system, the western nations and their regulators apparently ignored such 
warning signs and repeated the same mistakes of the past.  
The problems of regulatory governance have profound implications for 
economic growth and the welfare of nations. For example, beyond spending 12% of the 
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nation’s GDP in restructuring the banks, the crisis was probably responsible to a great 
extent for the stagnation of the Japanese economy in the 1990s (Brunner & Kamin, 
1995; Bayoumi, 1998; Motonishi  & Yoshikawa, 1998). Without appropriate economic 
policy and regulatory framework, a nation’s financial system becomes vulnerable to 
crisis and thus jeopardizes the stability of the entire economy. As argued by Hardy 
(2006), the system of regulatory controls strongly influences financial institutions’ 
behavior and performance, and therefore the supply of financing to the economy and the 
incentive to save. Therefore, it is extremely important that appropriate regulatory 
supervision be developed and directed to promote the creation of a financial system that 
is sound, efficient, and conducive to overall economic growth.  
Despite the merits of appropriate economic and regulatory policies to spur 
economic growth and financial stability, government intervention in the financial 
market is plagued with controversies. Advocates of intervention argue that the current 
recession and financial crisis constitute a manifestation of market failure and that the 
role of the government is to mitigate the undesirable consequences of market activity 
through regulation and appropriate fiscal policy instruments without losing the benefits 
of competitive economy. Proponents of the laissez-faire free-market system argue that 
without government intervention, the dynamics of demand and supply will help the 
economy adjust to recession and automatically correct its imbalances, by purging 
inefficiencies within the system, and then move toward equilibrium and the 
strengthening of the overall economy.  The question that comes to mind therefore is that 
from historical perspective, what does the evidence tell us? 
 
MARKET SOCIETY AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE ECONOMICS 
 The theory of laissez-faire economics is predicated on the idealized competitive 
model where the production of goods and services is governed by the rational actions of 
individuals in their capacity as consumers and producers. In an idealized competitive 
economy, market exchange is based on the fundamental principles of exclusion and 
revealed preferences (Allan 1971), free flow of information and self-regulating 
mechanisms. The assumption of the primacy of an individual’s interpretation of his or 
her own welfare, and of the revelation of his or her preferences by the choices made, 
constitute the basis of consumer sovereignty. Exchange between consumers and 
producers can occur only when there is exclusive title to the property to be exchanged 
and property rights can exist only if it is possible to exclude an individual from the 
consumption of a good or service for which he does not pay. The possibility of 
exclusion implies consumers have no choice but to bid for various goods and services, 
thereby revealing their preferences to producers. Consequently, utility maximizing 
consumers and profit maximizing producers interacting through the price mechanism 
achieve an efficient allocation of resources for a given distribution of income. An 
allocation is defined as efficient or Pareto-optimal when no re-allocation can improve 
the welfare of any individual without adversely affecting the welfare of any other 
(Davis & Kamien, 1977). 
The nineteenth century was characterized by the ‘market society’ that resulted 
from the liberal self-regulating state (Polanyi, 1957: 250). The liberal state represented 
decision makers who supported market oriented institutions and were driven by 
principles of economic liberalism.  This view of economic liberalism was rooted in the 
classical and neoclassical vision of economics which believed that some level of 
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competition provided adequate basis for the market to provide sufficient wealth without 
systematic state intervention (Galbraith, 1970:50). The underlying faith of such a vision 
was the ability of markets to restore to equilibrium based on the forces of demand and 
supply working through a healthy price mechanism. In a nutshell, the nineteenth century 
liberal state was marked by a disjuncture between politics and economics and an 
underdeveloped political market for prosperity due to the lack of incentive to relieve the 
macroeconomy from the burdens of recession and poverty (Galarotti, 2000). 
Consequently prices, employment and growth were merely residual properties of a 
system over which there was no political control. Thus the policy makers of the 
nineteenth century state were not held accountable for recession, unemployment and 
poverty, and therefore did not have the incentive to manage the macroeconomy. 
 The end of World War I saw the end of the market society and classical 
liberalism gave way to embedded liberalism – a liberal philosophy embedded in a 
socialist welfare concerns for growth, employment and redistribution (Ruggie, 1983; 
Polanyi, 1957). The war and economic turbulence in the 1920s served to consolidate an 
interventionist policy orientation that was germinating in the Progressive period before 
the war.  This forced many western nations to step forward as economic champions to 
maintain income and employment, and to put in place institutional infrastructure that 
laid the groundwork for the Keynesian policy responses to the Great Depression in the 
1930s. The adversity of the market at the time synthesized the rise of both the welfare 
state which provided safety net for society, and the interventionist state which 
incorporated functions and institutions aimed at macroeconomic stabilization for the 
purpose of maintaining income and employment (Gallarotti, 2000).  
 The Great Depression of the 1930s strongly reinforced the macroeconomic 
interventionist posture of the state in capitalist nations through both its length and 
severity, and the motivation to guard income and employment was heightened by the 
possibility of deep-secular stagnation in the economy (Gallarotti, 2000). As alluded to 
by Lehne (2006), the laissez-faire economists, who belong to the Classical tradition 
guided by economic liberalism and self-regulation, believed that in recessionary times 
when demand for goods and services was low, prices would fall, the revenues of 
inefficient producers would dwindle, workers would be laid off,  poorly managed 
factories would shut down, and the well managed surviving firms would supply 
society’s goods more efficiently to strengthen the overall economy. Demand would 
increase, resulting in strained productive capacity which would prompt producers to 
raise prices, and the economic cycle will begin again. Laissez faire economists therefore 
regarded layoffs, bankruptcies, and economic downturns as inherent elements of a 
natural process that would eventually improve the economy. Additionally, they believed 
government actions were more likely to disrupt the natural recuperative powers of the 
market system, rather than alleviating suffering and resuscitating economic activity 
(Lehne, 2006). The Great Depression however resulted in low aggregate spending and 
extremely high unemployment without creating the equilibrium the laissez-faire 
economists had anticipated.  
The consequence of the Great Depression was the realization that even the most 
advanced capitalist economies are not capable of achieving self-regulating growth. The 
laissez-faire neoclassical economic policies had resulted in a market failure 
characterized by an unprecedented social and economic crisis in terms of mass 
unemployment, fall in production and social and political unrest threatening the very 
survival of the capitalist world order. Between 1929 and 1933, the United States Gross 
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National Product (GNP) fell by 46%, unemployment rose from less than 4% of the labor 
force to over 25% by 1933, and the impact of the economic decline was felt by virtually 
every sector of the economy (Menza, 2000).  This, indeed, brought into reality and 
‘empiricized,’ some of the theoretical and normative arguments of Marxism.  According 
to Marxists, the primary objective of state in a capitalist society is the suppression of 
contradictions inherent in capitalism through, for example, the separation of the means 
of production from the producers of surplus value and the confining of the state’s 
economic role mainly to the protection of private property relations (Gamble &Walton, 
1976). Writing in the mid nineteenth century, Karl Marx saw capitalism as an 
evolutionary phase in economic development that would self-destruct to be succeeded 
by a world without private property. Marx believed all production belongs to labor 
because workers produce all value within society, while the market system allows 
capitalists, the owners of machinery and factories, to exploit workers by denying them a 
fair share of what they produce. Therefore, Marx predicted that capitalism would 
produce a growing misery for workers as competition for profit led capitalists to adopt 
labor-saving machinery, thereby creating a “reserve army of the unemployed” who 
would eventually rise up and seize the means of production (Itoh, 1988).   
In order to protect the capitalist state from self-destruction as predicted by Marx, 
many capitalist nations did not have a choice but to pursue policies of the social service 
state which rejects the apportionment of income and wealth produced by market activity 
and uses government authority to enhance societal equity. It was obvious that the liberal 
self-regulating state lacked the institutional capacity and control mechanisms to ensure 
the effectiveness of the free-market system. Additionally, both policy makers and 
market agents did not understand the conditions under which the production and 
distribution of a good or service through a competitive market in which all the relevant 
agents are pursuing their own self-interest will result in an allocation of that good or 
service that is socially inefficient. The capitalist crisis that resulted from self-regulation 
had intensified the working class struggle that began in the 1920s, spawned several 
social movements, including those among the unemployed workers, old age 
movements, and the industrial labor movements (Menza, 2000), and the bourgeoisie 
initiated welfare measures to protect their self-interest (Ginsburg, 1979).  Indeed, it is 
open secret that today, socialists, social democrats, social reformers, and conservatives 
all attach some importance to distributional issues, although their notions of equity 
range from egalitarian to merit-based (Lehne, 2006). It is therefore not surprising that 
the United States and other major industrial nations now devote about half of their 
outlays to social service purposes, such as healthcare, retirement costs, and assistance to 
low income groups. Unfortunately, this state of affairs has also resulted in rising 
national debts because the influence of politics on economic decision-making has often 
led to the social costs of implemented policies and programs exceeding social benefits.  
 
KEYNESIAN MODEL OF MACROECONOMICS AND THE NEW DEAL 
The interventionist policy orientation that began after World War I was given 
theoretical identity and intellectual legitimacy by the Keynesian revolution that took 
hold toward the end of the great depression. During the inter-war period, the state in the 
capitalist societies had learnt that the crisis in the capitalist economies could be averted 
by undertaking large-scale public expenditure, and John Maynard Keynes later made a 
theoretical summary of what the capitalist state ha
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(Robinson, 1973). Reacting to the severity of the worldwide depression, Keynes in 1936 
broke from the Classical tradition with the publication of The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money. Like many standard economists, Keynes believed that 
a given aggregate level of demand in an economy would produce a commensurate 
amount of employment. However, he also believed that falling prices and wages, by 
depressing people’s incomes, would prevent a revival of the spending. He argued low 
employment during the Great Depression resulted from inadequate demand, and 
government intervention was necessary to increase aggregate demand. Keynes’ 
arguments proved the modern rationale for the use of government spending and taxing 
to stabilize the economy. He showed that in a market economy, there is an inbuilt trend 
toward stagnation, implying that effective demand tends to be less than what is required 
for full utilization of productive capacity, thereby resulting in the dry up of capital 
accumulation.  
Keynes believed the objective of state intervention was to complement the 
market forces in achieving a high level of economic activity and full employment 
making the liberal market societies more productive, harmonious and suitable 
(Kethineni, 1991).  To counteract the falling demand, Keynes also advocated large-scale 
government expenditure on public works, especially roads, power projects, schools, 
hospitals, etc. (Brown, 1984). Western economies adopting Keynesian policy 
prescriptions sought to perfect the self-regulating capitalist system through series of 
interventionist measures to achieve both the objectives of social justice and freedom 
(Mishra, 1984). In the United States, the crisis of the Great Depression catapulted the 
Democratic Party to power in the 1932 elections, and ushered in the New Deal of the 
Roosevelt Administration with a number of legislative initiatives, political reforms and 
policy innovations. To help combat the recession, a series of emergency relief and work 
programs were adopted, including the Works Progress Administration, as well as the 
National Housing Act of 1934 (providing low interest loans) and the reform of the 
nation’s banking system. During the Great Depression, one out of three commercial 
banks in the United States closed between 1930 and 1933, bank loans fell by 44 percent 
and bank deposits had declined by 30 percent within the same period (Hawke, 1999). 
Congress enacted the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933, and among others, restricted 
affiliation between banks and security firms, and subsequent legislation also barred 
banks from owning insurance companies in order to safeguard customer deposits and 
restore confidence in the financial system. The Glass-Steagall Act also created the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to help boost customer confidence 
regarding the safety of their deposits.  
In order to safeguard citizens’ investments and enforce the restrictions of 
affiliation between banks and security firms, the Roosevelt Administration sought to 
regulate the activities of investment companies through the passage of the Security 
Exchange Act of 1934 and the creation of the Security and Exchange Commission. In 
spite of these interventionist efforts, recovery was slow and in the summer of 1935, a 
second set of reform legislations were passed. These include the Banking Act which 
centralized the Federal Reserve, and the Social Security Act which established 
unemployment insurance, old age insurance, old age assistance, and Aid to Dependent 
Children. The final major reform of the New Deal era was the adoption of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938 (Menza, 2000). The interventionist and regulatory 
measures of the new deal helped to stabilize the nation’s financial system and grow the 
economy. However, critics argue that the depression era rules have had unintended 
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consequences and that public agency self-interest was present in granting privileges and 
regulating.  
Bornemann (1976), for example, argues the depression era regulatory agency 
pursuing the generally perceived welfare of the particular constituency industry was, if 
anything, the captive of its own special interest rather than of outside special interests, 
even though the requirements it imposed coincided with the interpretations of interest 
group. Thus, when its own interest demanded protection and change, the agency 
undertook the necessary steps. Bidhe’ (2009) argues while the creation of the FDIC 
both ensured the safety of deposits and also freed bankers from the challenge of earning 
the confidence of depositors, banks used their regulatory canopy to undertake more 
complex and dangerous innovations. In the 1970s for instance, banks started using 
futures to hedge the risks of making long-term loans with short-term deposits. Without 
deposit insurance, and the reassurance of state supervision, most depositors, even the 
sophisticated ones, would shun banks that traded futures (Bidhe’ 2009). 
A central argument in the Keynesian theory of macroeconomics is that the 
government could counter a recession through fiscal policy by either reducing taxes to 
spur consumer or investment spending, or directly increasing its own spending, even if 
this could result in deficit spending. This implies in a period of deep recession, the 
government can, for example, engage in deficit spending by providing funds to financial 
institutions if it is deemed that such action could spur lending, increase private spending 
and investment and thus increase aggregate demand in the economy. The downside of 
government intervention through injection of funds into the financial system is that not 
only does it compromise the independence of the financial institutions but also could 
result in politically motivated forbearance, thereby posing challenges to effective 
regulatory governance. For example, in the United States, government injection of 
capital to rescue financial institutions has led to government ownership of substantial 
shares of many of these institutions at least in the short run. As stated earlier, the lack of 
independence of the Japanese financial supervision function within the ministry of 
finance is widely believed to have contributed to financial sector weaknesses. Although 
there was probably little direct pressure on the ministry of finance to exercise 
forbearance, the system lacked transparency and was known for widespread implicit 
government guarantees of banking sector liability (Udaibir, Quintyn & Taylor, 2002). 
The argument here is that while effective intervention is necessary for the proper 
functioning of the free market system, such policies should be implemented with 
caution as ill thought out intervention could be ineffective, and result in higher than 
socially efficient cost of such intervention.  
In the process of using state intervention to complement market forces in 
achieving high economic activity, many western countries engaged in massive deficit 
financing, with potential adverse impact on the economy.  Large fiscal deficits result in 
higher real rates of interest or larger stocks of international debts, with consequent 
negative effects on investment expenditures, capital stocks, and future per capita 
national income levels.  Larger fiscal deficits also tend to lead, frequently, to higher 
rates of inflation in the long run and undermine the stability of a nation’s economic 
system if the deficit is financed by selling bonds to the central bank, i.e., by printing 
money (Mishra, 2001). This could, in turn, lead to massive decreases in government 
revenues and mounting budget deficits, and force western governments to reduce public 
expenditure on social programs and regulatory monitoring. 
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Historical evidence suggests that mounting deficits and the arrival of stagflation 
all over the western capitalist world in the 1970s threw the Keynesian economics into 
disarray and the welfare state lost its ideological as well as material basis (Kethineni, 
1991). The stagflation in the 1970s was overcome at very high cost. While the world 
economy expanded at about 5.1% during the period 1960-1973, it grew at much slower 
3.2% during the period 1973-1989, due mainly to worldwide squeeze on profits and 
restrain on investments, jobs and growth caused by tight energy supplies (Sachs, 2008). 
With the discredit of Keynesianism, laissez-faire economics gained a new impetus and 
re-metamorphosed into neo-classical monetarism with the call for cut in government 
spending on social services, privatization, new public management, liberalized financial 
markets, tax concession to the rich, decreasing the role of the state and public 
expenditure, and the free play of the market forces in the economy (Brown, 1984). 
 
FINANCIAL SECTOR LIBERALIZATION AND THE 2008 GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 The emergence of neo-classical monetarism, new public management and 
economic globalization did play integral role in the financial sector liberalization that 
ultimately led to the current global financial and economic crisis.  The sea change of 
public sector reform in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in privatization, outsourcing and 
load shedding of public responsibilities, with the United States and the United Kingdom 
leading the way. During the same time, discourse about the proper size, role and 
functions of government underwent sharper transformation (Lee & Strang, 2006). While 
the neo liberals argued for the importation of market mechanisms into the public arena, 
their New Public Management allies argued lean public agencies will be responsive to 
citizen customers (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Some empirical evidence (Lee & Strang, 
2006) reveal that downsizing has international contagious effect, and that change in the 
size of the public sector is linked not only to domestic economic and political conditions 
but also international policy diffusion.  Neoclassical liberalism and the call for New 
Public Management led to market-based regulation of certain public entities, including 
financial institutions in the western world, and ushered in periods of not only economic 
growth but also unrestrained capital markets. Indeed, since the beginning of the 1990s, 
the world had seen a shift from a largely legally based regulatory approach toward a 
greater use of voluntary, collaborative or market-based regulatory instruments (Busch, 
Jorgens & Tews, 2005). In fact, existing governmental regulatory institutions were 
paralyzed by the problem of regulatory capture, regulatory forbearance and regulatory 
arbitrage. Consequently, little or no institutional safeguards and control mechanisms 
were put in place to guard against the excesses of the free market self-regulatory 
system.  
The liberalization of the financial markets coupled with self-regulation resulted 
in the proliferation of financial products that substantially increased the risks of 
financial institutions with little or no oversight by financial regulators. Money markets 
and mutual funds eroded traditional lending franchises, and banks securitized all kinds 
of loans, mortgages, credit card and auto loans, traditionally referred to as asset-backed 
securities (ABS), by packaging them as bundles and selling off shares to investors. 
Securitization involves packaging financial promises and transforming their cash flows 
into a form whereby they can be freely traded among investors. Minton, Sanders & 
Strahan (2004) suggest that from 1995 through 2001, the market for ABS increased 
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from $316 billion outstanding to $1.69 trillion. As argued by Bhide’ (2009), 
securitization meant banks had to warehouse their loans for short periods, and this 
encouraged them to not only lower credit standards but also to extend mortgages to sub-
prime borrowers who could not pay. New securities also created opportunities for 
reckless speculative trading, while banks extended credits to the trading operations of 
investment banks, hedge funds and warehouses of dodgy sub-prime loans awaiting 
securitization.  
While the excesses of the liberalized financial market activities went on, 
regulators exercised forbearance and succumbed to the idea, peddled by financiers and 
modern financial theorists, that if a little financial innovation was good, a lot must be 
great (Bhide’, 2009). As argued by Kanaya & Woo (2000) if there is a lesson that the 
global financial system learnt from the Japanese financial crisis of the 1990s, it is that 
liberalization without proper regulations and undue regulatory forbearance have the 
potential disastrous consequences for a nation’s financial system and the entire 
economy. In the case of the 2008 global financial crisis, regulators tried to adapt instead 
of discharging their oversight responsibilities by taking appropriate measures to curb the 
so called financial innovations that were far outside their capacity to monitor. The 
regulators should have understood that merely requiring banks to hold more capital for 
riskier assets, to disclose what proportion of their trading positions could not be marked 
to market, and pressing dealers to improve the processing of trades in over-the counter 
derivatives, in the face of mounting complex and high risk transactions, would prove 
ineffective. It is therefore not surprising that given the asymmetry of resources and 
incentives, the measures proved inadequate and the regulators could not keep up 
(Bhide’ 2009). Unfortunately, the policy makers and the regulators they oversee once 
again failed to learn from history by ignoring the lessons of the past and by not adopting 
what worked in the past.  
Regulatory capture was a prime factor in the liberalization of the banking 
industry in the late 1990s. As indicated earlier, the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933 
restricted affiliation between banks and security firms, and subsequent legislation also 
barred banks from owning insurance companies in order to safeguard customer deposits 
and restore confidence in the financial system. In 1999, Congress passed, and President 
Clinton signed into law, the Financial Services Modernization Act, which repealed parts 
of the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933 and allowed banks to become affiliated with 
security firms and insurance companies (Lehne, 2006) without putting in place 
appropriate safeguards to address the fallouts from deregulation and inefficiencies in the 
free-market system. This was in spite of the fact that a similar deregulation in 1982 
which expanded the range of permissible investments in the savings and loans 
institutions resulted in the collapse of those institutions, costing the tax payers several 
billions of dollars. Faced with several criticisms that the financial services industry had 
put profit above safety and soundness by pushing for the legislation, supporters of the 
Financial Services Modernization Act insisted it will spur competition in the industry, 
reduce prices, enhance the stability of the nation’s financial services system, equip 
financial services firms to compete more effectively in global financial markets, and 
improve responsiveness to consumers (Weissman, 1999).  The evidence now shows that 
while the Act spurred competition, it did not stabilize but rather, contributed toward the 
crippling of the nation’s financial services industry, and responsiveness to consumers 
was at best minimal.  
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The neoliberal policies in the financial sector, coupled with the information and 
capital flow across continents stemming from technological advancement and 
globalization did facilitate what some scholars term as global diffusion of regulatory 
capitalism. Diffusion in this instance refers to an international spread of policy 
innovation driven by information flows rather than hierarchical or collective decision 
making within international institutions (Busch, Jorgens & Tews, 2005). At the micro 
level, it is triggered by processes of social learning, copying or mimetic emulation 
(Lazer, 2005; Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). The essential feature of policy diffusion is that 
it occurs in the absence of formal or contractual obligation, and is basically a horizontal 
process whereby individually adopted regulatory approaches add up to a decentralized 
regulatory structure (Levi-Faur, 2005). Unlike the case of multilateral legal treaties 
which are negotiated centrally between states and subsequently implemented top-down, 
diffusion decision-making procedures are decentralized and remain at the national level. 
Thus, other western nations experienced liberalization of their financial systems and 
thereby imported any potential economic and financial malaise, through the diffusion of 
regulatory capitalism, into their economies without any meaningful analysis as to the 
historical significance of such diffusion.  
Regarding developing nations, the liberal economic policies packaged under the 
Washington consensus which aimed at opening up national economies of those 
countries, and reducing the role of the state, with privatization, deregulation and support 
for property rights (Williamson, 1990) is widely believed among scholars and 
practitioners to have generated policy learning among nations. This implies what 
happens in the United States and other major western countries have repercussions for 
the rest of the world as evidenced by the 2008 global financial and economic crisis. 
However, as demonstrated by Weyland (2004), bounded learning overrides rational 
learning in the sense that while politicians do actively seek solutions to their problems 
by purposive search, their search is biased by the use of particular cognitive shortcuts. 
Basically, governments look at what is close, favor initial successes and tend to limit the 
number of changes in the implementation of foreign policy models. Consequently, 
many of these governments almost copy blindly, and in the process end up deteriorating 
their economies and worsening the plight of many of their citizens.  
Given the enormity of the global financial crisis, most reasonable minds agree that 
government intervention is necessary to turn the global economy around. However, the 
history of public economic management suggests that mutual coexistence of the market 
and government serves the best interest of society. Self-regulation during the pre 
depression era proved catastrophic, and excesses of Keynesianism in the post-war era 
proved costly. Additionally, ineffective regulatory governance in the mist of intense 
market competition is problematic. Considering the history and consequences of 
government response to financial and economic crisis, the questions that beg answering 
are: What analysis has been performed to get to the root cause of the problem? What 
institutional safeguards are being put in place to avoid excesses and inefficiencies of 
intervention? What measures of accountability are being implemented to ensure judicious 
use of tax payers’ money? What performance measures are being formulated and 
implemented to ensure the intended goals are achieved? What regulatory framework is 
being put in place to modernize financial oversight and ensure effective regulatory 
governance? Finally, how do western governments ensure that the interventionist policies 
being pursued do not end up further wrecking the global economy and usher in another 
round of calls for unfettered free-market system? 
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ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The global financial and economic crisis has profound policy and administrative 
implications when placed in historical context regarding prudent regulatory governance 
and healthy financial and economic system.  Each nation seeks governing arrangements 
that help it to achieve material well-being and to secure its political and social goals. As 
argued by Lehne (2006), a society establishes a set of political institutions, which in turn 
construct the legal framework in which the country’s economy operates and its markets 
function. This framework reflects the nation’s political judgment, and since the nation’s 
political values permeate economic institutions, markets can never be completely 
divorced from politics and public policy. Therefore, despite the different governing 
arrangement of each nation, the basic truth is that although politics and markets are 
frequently viewed as alternative mechanisms guiding societies, they are indeed, 
intertwined (Zysman, 1983; Dobbin 1994). This implies the nature of a nation’s public 
policy and hence regulatory framework impacts the functioning of its financial and 
economic system.  
Although there is widespread speculation about the future of the free-market 
system as a result of the current financial and economic crisis, the fact is that in the 
capitalist societies, the market and government do and can complement each other given 
appropriate administrative and institutional capacities, as well as enforceable regulations. 
Indeed, the principal task of government under the market capitalist model is to guarantee 
that the markets function properly.  For example, free markets with self-interested agents 
tend to under provide activities with positive external benefits and over provide activities 
with negative external costs because the agents do not consider these costs and benefits in 
their decision making. The financial institutions operating in the unregulated sub-prime 
mortgage sector over produced such mortgages based on profit motivations without 
considering the external costs to society because they were not obligated to do so. The 
regulatory arbitrage that characterized the sub-prime market encouraged corporate greed 
and adjustable rate mortgage loans were granted to many consumers who clearly were 
incapable of repaying these loans. The United States government had obligation to 
intervene through tailored regulatory mechanisms to protect not only society but also the 
financial institutions from unreasonable risks. In this regard, government intervention 
would have been a necessary ingredient for the stability and survival of the financial 
institutions, and for the safeguard of governmental resources that otherwise could have 
been used to provide various social services. Unfortunately, the government failed in its 
oversight responsibility, thereby costing society hundreds of billions of dollars.  
The legislature establishes public policy by passing laws and playing 
administrative role through the monitoring of budgets and overseeing government 
administrative operations such as regulatory activities. However, the effectiveness of 
discharging its administrative responsibilities is usually hampered by self-interest, 
campaign contributions and rent seeking from special interest and certain business groups. 
This results in inefficient government intervention, as concentrated benefits and diffused 
costs from rent seeking usually divert societal resources to certain privileged groups at the 
expense of broader social interests.  Financial institutions, like any other industry group, 
will want to influence the regulator to favor their interests, and they typically have the 
means to engage in rent seeking in this regard. Rent seeking leads to regulatory capture, 
and a captured regulator acts primarily in the interest of the regulated institutions, rather 
than in accordance with their putative mandate to promote the common good. 
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Considering the fact that banking is characterized by asymmetric information between 
banks and their clients and that risk is an inherent feature of the banking industry, the 
need for independent regulation of the industry is paramount.  
The independence of the legislature and regulators from undue special influence is 
crucial in formulating and implementing policies for which the marginal social costs do 
not exceed the marginal social benefits. Problems such as bureaucratic bottlenecks and 
weaker incentives for innovation reduce the ability of administrative agencies to use 
appropriate regulatory tools to efficiently intervene in the market system. Therefore, there 
is the need for the legislature and the administrative agency heads to work jointly to 
modernize and streamline existing procedures and technology, and put in place 
appropriate measures of performance and accountability in order to bring monitoring and 
enforcement tools to the twenty first century, and to facilitate legislative oversight 
activities. Considering the destructive and ripple down effects of the financial crisis and 
the diversion of public resources to rescue financial institutions, there is the need to 
rethink the way the financial services sector is regulated. The focus should not only be on 
compliance but also on efficiency, risk management and global coordination through 
appropriate use of technology and innovative processes to minimize the chances of 
failure.  
Policy makers need to recognize that liberalization without appropriate controls 
within the regulatory environment, as well as ill-thought out and uncoordinated regulation 
can destabilize a country’s financial and economic system with far reaching global 
implications. For example, regulatory arbitrage resulting from unequal regulatory and 
supervision of different financial institutions engaging in similar securitization activities 
can result in unhealthy competition and concentration of risks. Additionally, although 
regulation and bank supervision are viewed in many circles as the last line of defense, 
there is the need for regulatory authorities to take proactive attitude toward supervision. 
As argued by Kanaya and Woo (2000), regulatory forbearance can postpone a crisis, but 
at the cost of raising the fiscal cost of the final resolution. By giving rise to moral hazard 
problems, regulatory forbearance and “too big to fail” doctrines can lead to “gamble for 
resurrection” which often weakens financial institutions further. Therefore, Prompt 
Corrective Action framework is often necessary to save financial institutions and the 
economy from  deterioration (Kanaya & Woo, 2000). 
In the formulation of interventionist policies, western governments need to 
recognize that with the private sector being the largest employer in capitalist societies 
such as the United States, the economic power of the market and its corporate agents 
can not be ignored. The decisions private firms such financial institutions make about 
production, investment and employment do affect both citizens’ living standards and 
public revenues. This implies the need for appropriate legal, regulatory and business 
environment to enhance economic growth and employment while controlling inflation. 
Government policies that unduly threaten the banking and financial environment could 
stifle innovation and reduce business and economic activity. When that happens, 
business investment, production and employment could decline, resulting in decreased 
standard of living, economic deprivation, lower government revenues, astronomical 
budget deficits and potential social unrest. Creating the right banking and financial 
environment, however, does not mean lapses in regulatory enforcement as we have seen 
in the financial services sector in recent years. What it does mean is both the 
government and the agents of the free market system working and complementing each 
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other to ensure economic growth and social diversity without dominance by any 
particular institution as long as societal norms, rules and regulations are enforced.  
While interventionist policies to correct market failure is unavoidable in many 
situations, government and its regulatory agencies should be cognizant of the fact that 
under certain conditions, deregulation can be helpful and lead to economic expansion if 
planned carefully and implemented skillfully. A typical example is the deregulation that 
broke up the AT&T monopoly in the United States and facilitated the 
telecommunication revolution. Times do change and so do socio-economic and 
technological factors which result in structural changes in the economy, requiring 
modernization of existing regulatory framework for continual economic growth and 
higher employment. What is inexcusable is the failure, in the deregulation process, to 
learn from the past and to put in place institutional safeguards and risk control 
mechanisms to address potential problems. Unfortunately, the policy makers failed to 
learn from history by doing away with the post-Great Depression safety and soundness 
in the financial system and by not implementing comparable safeguards and, as a result, 
the United States  and the rest of the world is now paying for such mistakes with 
billions of taxpayer’s money.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The banking and financial crisis that began in 2008 is rooted in liberalization 
without appropriate adjustment of the regulatory environment, ineffective regulatory 
governance and failure to learn from history. Without appropriate economic policy and 
regulatory framework, a nation’s financial system becomes vulnerable to crisis and 
jeopardizes the stability of the entire economy. The system of regulatory controls 
strongly influences financial institutions’ behavior and performance, and therefore the 
supply of financing to the economy, the incentive to save and aggregate demand. 
Excessive asset expansion during economic boom and market liberalization requires the 
establishment of appropriate economic and regulatory policies to guard against market 
failure, to prevent political and institutional interference in the regulatory supervision of 
financial institutions, and to prevent regulatory forbearance, regulatory arbitrage and 
regulatory capture.   
Historical accounts and evidence show that dominations of either the free-market 
system or government intervention in an economy have had disastrous consequences 
mainly due to the failure to avoid past mistakes, to build on past successes, and to put in 
place institutional safeguards and control mechanisms to minimize potential 
inefficiencies. Governments in capitalist societies depend on business for investment, 
production, employment, higher standard of living and government revenues. This calls 
for regulatory and business environment that encourages higher aggregate demand and 
high economic growth, as well as increased revenues to fund government budgetary 
priorities. The market and its self-interest agents, on the other hand, depend on 
government for competitive operating environment to ensure level playing field and 
profitability. This implies both government and the market need to co-exist in a manner 
that respects the contribution of each other toward sustainable and vibrant economy in a 
democratic society. Such coexistence will be beneficial with a regulatory framework that 
emphasizes compliance, efficiency, risk management and global coordination through 
appropriate use of technology and innovative processes to minimize the chances of 
failure.  
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